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Introduction
One goal of communication research has been to isolate
diffe~ences

variables which ·can account for individual

in

the acceptance or rejection of persuasive communications.
·The self-esteem or favorableness of self-rating of the
recipient is one such variable.
The purpose of this investigation 1s to determine the
relationship between resistance to persuasion and generalized
self-esteem.

--

Resistance is studied as a function of

~re-

treatments which, when administered to a receiver, render
..,/\

him less susceptible to ,persuasive

mess~ge~

found to be without these pretreatments.

than he is

A cursory review

of contemporary literature in this area might lead one to
believe that the relationship has already been · formulated.
Cox and Bauer (1964) tell us, "A well established finding
in the literature on personality and persuasibility is that
males low in self-esteem, or generalized self-confidence,
are on the whole more readily persuaded than males high in
self-confidence."

Or to put it . in another way; males with

high self-esteem are more resistant to persuasive attempts
than males with low self-esteem.
It should be made clear that while the current investigation involves "resistance" to -persuasion, the vast majority
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of related work in this area refers to "persuasibility."
Unlike the resistance research paragigm, persuasibility
research usually does not involve messages which are
designed to protect beliefs.
~anis

(1954, 1955), Janis and Field (1959), and Janis

and Rife (1959) hypothesized that self-esteem would corr--_

relat e negatively with persuasibility , in young adults.
The ir rationale was that compliance is a defensive attempt
t o avoid displeasing anydne.

The composite results of the

fo ur studies offer somewhat weak and dubious support for
the ir h ypothesis.

This is so because (1) the trends are

s ma ll and usually insignificant;
p r a ctically impossible to compare

(2) the studies are
dire~tly,

due to variations

in me th ods and types . of subjects; and (3) 1n any
correlati~g

des~gn

a contemporary characteristic of a subject with

a "consequent" behavior, there is much danger of artifa.c tual
con tamination between the two measures being correlated
( Wylie, 1961).
For example, 1n two of the four studies (Janis, 1954;
Janis and Field, 1959), self-esteem was measured by a
sp e cially assembled collection of personality ·questionnaire
items which the experimenter subdivided by inspection into
three clusters.

It appears that the two studies did not

employ the same criterion to establish levels of selfesteem.

Self-esteem was inferred by Janis (1954) from 38

items selected from "standard inventories" classed on the

3

basis of manifest content into (a)
(b) inhibit~on of aggression,

~ocial

(c) depression,
-~

anxiety,

inadequacy,

(3) obsessional symptoms.

.

(~)

neurotic

Janis (1954) used the

first three clusters to measure self-esteem.

Janis and

Field (1959) published three apparently different clusters:
(a) social inadequacy,
anxiety.

(b) so.cial inhibition,

(c) test

Still, Wylie (1961) reported that the estimated

coefficient of reliability, using the Spearman-Brown
formula, for these clusters ra~ged from +.65 to +.91.

In

a third study (Janis and Rife, 1959), only one of the Janis
and Field clusters was used (social inadequacy) as the
self-esteem measure.

In the fourth study
(Janis, 1955) a
,

socially oriented "anxiety" cluster from Sarason's Test
Anxiety Questionnaire. was the self-esteem index.
Also, three different measures of persuasibility were
used in the four studies.
persu~sibility

Janis and Rife (1959) used a

test developed in part by Janis and

Fie~d.

Janis and Field (1959) used what they termed a "new"
persuasibility te$t developed by themselves.
(1954~

And, Janis

measured persuasibility using three questions

originally developed by Hovland and Weiss (1951).
The Janis (1954) study supports the hypothesis that
high self-esteem ·subjects were significantly less persuasible than low self-esteem subjects for two out of three
clusters of the self-esteem index.

Persuasibility was

found to be p ositively correlated with the "neurotic
anxiety " and " obse ss ional symptoms•• self-esteem clusters.

4.

Subsequent evidence (Janis, 1955) failed to confirm the
inverse relation between persuasibility and self-esteem.
I

·~

.

In the Janis and Field (1959) study, only two out of six
measures of validity reached acceptable levels of s1gn1ficance.

Their results showed significant coTrelations

between persuasibility and the self-esteem clusters of
"social inadequacy" and "social inhibitions."
highly significant

corre~ation

The only

was obtained by Janis and

Rife (1959) between one of the Janis and Field self-esteem
clusters (social inadequacy) and a persuasibility test
given to hospitalized, emotionally disturbed males.
However, a substantial difference was found between means
of normal and abnormal groups.

The difference approached

significance beyond tbe 10 per cent confidence level

(

= 1.81; p <.08, two-tail).

It would appear unrealistic

to generalize to other populations from this sample.
,
Even if all the correlations had come from
procedures and had been highly
interpretation would remain.

signifi~ant,

compa~able

a problem of

This problem lies in the
I

possible confounding · between persuasibility and initial
opinion.

That is, if groups classed as high; medium, and

low on persuasibility also differed systematically on
their initial opinions, one could not tell whether selfesteem was associated with initial opinions, persuasibility,
I

or both.

Apparently the correlation of initial opinion

with opinion change was not explored 1n any of these

5.

studies.

Related to this question, however, Janis reported

in his 1954 article that he examined the precommunication
·~

opinions of the personality groups.
signific~nt

or

~Qnsistent

account for the observed
(p. 514) ."

diffe~ences
differen. ~es

He says (1954) "No
were found which could
in. opinion change ,.

A similar control observation was not reported

in the other three

studi~s . .

In criticizing his other study

(Janis and Field, 1959) the author reports that "it is
measuring something quite different from what is measured
by t h e self-ratings, but there is only one significant
correl~tion,

which is not a very large one, while the others

are too small to approach statistical significance.

Per-

haps the main reason for the low correlations is that the
self-rati~g

scores have low .reliability (p. 257)."

Abelson and Lesser (1959) proposed that self-esteem
1n children is

n~gatively

associated with persuasibility.

Self-esteem was measured in three ways:

(1)

Children were

f

asked to compare themselves with the other children in the
class on certain favorable but
'

amb~guous

charact~ristics;

.

(2) Each subject ~ai asked which children in his class

liked him and

woul~

choose to sit next to him;

(3) Finally,

the discrepancy between
the rank of the second measure and
... .
the child's actual

so~iome~ric

rank was obtained.

It is

not clear why the third Lindex should be called a "selfesteem" measu-re, since it involves mo're • than the subject's

6

In a later study, the authors deleted this

self-report.

"third" measure of self-esteem.
In contrast to the · studies mentioned above, persuasibility was not measured in terms of before and after change
scores.

The specially devised Persuasibility Booklet .

contained pairs of pictures of unfamiliar objects.
assumed that the subjects' attitude toward

It was

eith~r p~cture

in a pair would be neutral unless influenced by someone
else's expressed opinion. · By avoiding before and after
measures, the authors hoped to avoid the "initial opinion
artifact'' (Wylie,

~961).

The teacher or experimenter indicated which picture
she liked better ln each pair and then she asked the
subjects to indicate their choice.

Persuasibility was

measured ln terms of the -number of·agreements between
child and communicator.
Eleven groups of first-grade subjects were used, and
since there were three self-esteem indices, 33 measures of
validity were . obtained between self-esteem and persuaslbility scores.

Twenty-two of these measures of validity

were in the predicted

direc~ion,

but none were significant.

When groups were separated by sex, only the third measure
of self-esteem prQvided significant support for the
hypothesis.

Again, this is the . measure which was deleted

in subsequent studies, apparently due to a lack of face
validity.

7

In a second study by these authors, children were
designated as high or low in self-esteem on the basis of
~

a combination of the first and second self-esteem measures.
The experimenter first elicited an individual child's preferences on piii~ of ·pictures, then agreed or disagreed wit4
th e child's selection.

Next, . she attempted to influence

t h e children on fourteen pictures by presenting her own
op inion before the child expressed his.

Children with low

s elf -esteem were signi f icantly more persuasible on the final
f ou r teen pictures than were children with

h~gh

self-esteem.

Sign ificant results were obtaineq in each of two

replicat~ons.

Thi s was a significant interaction effect, since. it was
only after experimenter agreement in the initial part of
the procedure that the · subjects with low self-esteem scores
e xhib i t ed greater
p ictures.

persuas~bility

The ~ authors

on the final fourteen

speculate that the low self-esteem

c hi ld reacts sensitively to the approval he seeks from
others and is predisposed to be persuasible only if the
communicator indicates to him the likely possibility · that
·'

they will agree with .each other.
Only in the second study did these investiga-tors
obtain support for the prediction that self-esteem is
negatively related to persuasibility in first-grade
children.

Why null results were obtained from the first

two measures in their first

des~gn

is difficult to ascertain.

It may be that the relation between self-esteem and

8

persuasibility 1s not obtained unless

th~

experimenter has

indicated that the reward of agreement with him is a
~

possibility.
Cohen (1959) concluded that within interacting pa1rs
of persons, subjects who are high in self-esteem will exert
more influence on a common judgment and/or will perceive
themselves as attempting to influence the partner more often
than will subjects low in self-esteem.

However, it must be

noted that Cohen's conclusion is more speculative than
empirically supported.

In fact, the experiment was

originally designed for another purpose, that of measuring
attitude change of subjects in relation to similar and
dissimilar source characteristics.
only as a control variable for the

Self-esteem was employed
similar~ty

manipu+ation.

Janis, Field, Rife, Abelson, and Lesser all assumed
that subjects with low self-esteem are persuasible because
they have an especially strong need to avoid

displeasi~g

others.
Linton and Graham's

(1959) study is more complicated

than any of the above investigations because they utilized
more measures of personality,

includi~g

some which pur-

ported to index both the conscious and unconscious self
lmages of the subjects.

Persuasibility was measured on

two questions 1n an opinion-change test;

On the basis of

this test, subjects were subdiyided into three unequal
size groups:

those who changed toward the opiriions
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expressed 1n the persuasive communication (positive changers),
those who changed away from the persuasive communication
(negative . changers), and nonchangers.

There was no control

group to establish what changes would occur without systematic intervening influence, nor.to provide a basis for
establishing the cutting points between what might be called
nonsignificant change (i.e., nonchange) and significant
change (i.e., change in either a positive or negative
direction).

The

n~gative ·

change . group was cut much nearer

the 0% change point than was the positive change group.
' This decision was apparently made p.artly on the basis of a
preliminary analysis of the relation between independent
and dependent variables (Wylie, 1961).
whether the change

g~oups

were

match~d

answers, but this seems unlikely.

We cannot know
as to their original

If they were not matched

on original answers, .this . leaves the possibility that the
personality variables might be associated with the position
of the subjects' original answers to the opinion items,
rather than being associated with the subjects' changeability
of oplnlon.

Thus, there would be a distinct possibility

of internal invalidity due to

statistica~

regression.

On the personality measurement side of the study,
authors assumed the validity of certain Machovei

th~

f~gure

drawing scales for revealing the subjects' unconscious
self image.

This assumption has been challenged on the

basis of extensive literature reviews by Levy (1950) and
by Swensen (1957).

Twe:lve out of the 38 figure drawing
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compar1sons significantly differentiated,positive changers
from the other two groups.

But in the light of the unproven
~

validity of the test, as well as the questions already
raised about the formation of the groups, one wonders how
to interpret these statistical findings.
In summary, before it ii concluded that a generalized
relationship between "self-est·eem" and "persuasibili ty" has
b e en demonstrated, we
about the related

mu~t

studies~

results are inconsistent.

remember the following facts
(1) Conclusions and significant

(2) Every study used a different

combination of self-esteem and persuasibility measures.
Intercorrelation

arno~g

self-esteem measures between studies

has not been sufficiently demonstrated.

No intercorrelations

among persuasibility or conformity measures are available.
We should avoid generalizations based on assigning the
same label to several possibly unrelated instruments.
short, one cannot combine the

findi~gs

from the several

studies into a pattern which has a clear meaning.
ins~gnificant

reversals from

trends were obtained>
p~edicted

includi~g

associations.

In

(3) Many

insignificant

(4) The possibility

of artifact has not been ruled out in all studies.

In

particular the "initial opinion" has not been adequately
controlled for in the opinion change studies (Wylie, 1961).
Since previous findings are inconsistent, it is not
possible to derive a formal hypothesis for the current
study.

While this study deals with persuasibility and

self-esteem, it deals so in a more specific way than that
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of previous research in that resistance to persuas1on,
rather than persuasibility, is the

d~~endent

measure.

Con-

£erring resistance to persuasion as considered here involves
giving a person some specific training (communication) that
would enhan·ce his ability to adhere to hi$ belief when
subsequently confronted with influence {persuasive) attempts
(McGuire, 19 6 4) .
McGuire's series of experiments on inducing
resistance to persua·sion stems from .a biological
analogy, whence the term "inoculation theory." In
the biological situation, the person is typically
made resistant to some attacking virus by preexposure to a weakened dose of the virus.
This
mild dose stimulates his defenses so that he will be
better able to overcome any massive viral attack to
which he is later expo~ed, but is not so ~trong
that this pre-exposure w~ll itself cause the
disease.
Alternatively, biological resistance can
be augmented by supportive therapy such as adequate
rest, good diet, and vitamin supplements.
Inoculation
is likely to be superior to supportive therapy to
the extent that the person has previously been
brought up in a germ-free environment.
It is a
seeming paradox that individuals taised aseptically
tend to appear vigorously healthy (even without
supportive therapy) but are highly vulnerable when
suddenly exposed to massive doses of the disease
virus (McGuire, 1964, p. 200).
McGuire theorized that to directly apply his

biol~gical

analogy, he should "deal as far as possible with beliefs
that had been maintained 1n a 'germ-free' ideological
environment, that is, beliefs that the person has seldom,
if ever, heard attacked (1964, p. 200)."

He therefore used

only "cultural truisms," strongly held beliefs about health
practices, as issues in his experiments.
McGuire's inoculation theory assumes that pretreatments
des~gned

to make beliefs resistant to subsequent persuasive
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attacks will be effective to the extent that they overcome
two basic difficulties:

one, the

b~}iever

is unpracticed

in defending his belief; and two, he is unmotivated to
undertake the necessary practice because he
belief unassailable.

conside~s

the

McGuire hypothesized that motivation

to defend belief in a truism · could be effected by causing
a listener to perceive his belief as vulnerable, and that
such a perception could be accomplished through pre-exposure
to weakened forms of subsequent counterarguments.
motivation alone was not expected

t~

Further,

supply resistance

since an individual may not have available any defensive
material with which to refute an attack.

Thus, some

amount of guidance is needed to aid in the development of
such belief-bolstering material (McGuire, 1964).

McGuire's

(1964) study showed that - defenses which present arguments

supporting the belief are less effective in conferring
resistance to subsequent strong attack than are refutational-same defenses.

The latter ignore arguments positively

supporting the belief but do mention and refute the same
arguments against the belief as are to be used in the subsequent attack.

He also found that a refutational defense

is almost as effective when it refutes arguments against
the belief which are different from those to be used in
the later attack as when it refutes the very same arguments
used in the attack.
Only three studies that involve resistance to persuas1on
as a function of self-esteem are available.

All three of
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these (Kelman, 1950; Mausner, 1954; Samelson, 1957) attempt
to experimentally manipulate self-esteem,

rath~r

than

investigate generalized self-esteem's relationship to res1stance to persuasion.
a prior success

These researchers demonstrated that

~xperience

enhances the believer's resistance

to subsequent persuasive attempts.

Resistance was increased,

even when the task on which the individual succeeded was
quite· different from the . task employed in the influence
attempt.

The current study does not

self-esteem.

~

at~empt

to manipulate

purpose of this study is to determine the

relationship between resistance to peisuasion and generalized
self-esteem.
Cox and Bauer's. (1964) statement, "a 1iell established
findin~,"

concerning this relationship receives only

sporadic s~pport.

Sine~ Prev~ous research is lnconsistent,

the following research questions will be examined in order
to evaluate this phenomena:

1.

What i~ .the relationship betw~en resistance to
persuasion and _ieneral self-e~t~~m?

2.

What type of defense is best · suited for lo~· · self
esteem individuals· to accomplish resistance to
persuasion for moderately he~d beliefs?

3.

What type of defense is best suited for high selfesteem individuals for moderately held beliefs?

4.

Of supportive, refutation-same, and refutationdifferent, wh.ich defense is the best suited for
all subjects combined for moderately held beliefs?

In order to examine these questions, an experimental
group (3 x 2 design) and a control group (2 x 2) was employed
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The experimental group was divided into high self-esteem
and low self-esteem with subjects

r~domly

receiving one

of the three defenses:· · refutational-same, refutationaldifferent or

s~pportive.

into high and low

The control group, also divided

self-~steem,

received an attack-only

or a neither defense, nor attack message .

..

Methodol~gy

"Subj ·e ·c·ts
Approximately 200 male Army reserve members, including
officers and enlisted men, were used as subjects.
men were
Georgia.

servi~g

a two week

traini~g

These

period at Fort Stewart,

Subjects were seen in three separate . groups,

varying in size from fifty to eighty subjects per group.
These subjects were made available as students for a
weekly training session.
Subjects'

~ges

ranged from 18 to 47.

It is also

interesting to note that occupations ranged from Chemists
and

H~gh

School Principals to common labor.

The reserve

rank of subjects ranged from Private to Colonel.
section of race, education, and.

ge~graphical

A cross

habitat was

noted for all groups.
Independent control groups were used to obtain initial
mean belief levels and · to exam1ne the effects of the
belief-attacking messages without the belief-defending
messages on initial belief levels.

Individual subjects

were exposed to only one type ' of defense:

supportive,

refutational-same, or· refutational-different.
De·s ·ign
There were a total of ten conditions; s1x (3 x 2) of
which represented the experimental conditions (see Table 1),
15
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and four.(2 x 2) of which represented the control conditions
(see Table 2) .
TABLE 1
Proposed/Actual Distribution and
Division·- of Expe.rimental Cells and Subjects
Subjects with High
Self-Esteem ·

Subjects with Low
Self-Esteem

Supportive

20/2.1 Subjects

20/19 Subjects

RefutationalSame

20/18 Subjects

20/22 Subjects

RefutationalDifferent

20/18 Subjects

20/22 Subjects

Type of Defense

TABLE 2
Proposed/Actual Distribution and
Division of Control Cells _and Subjects
Control

Conditi~n

Subjects with High
Self-Esteem

Subjects with Low
Self-Esteem

Neither/Nor

20/24 Subjects

20/16 Subjects

Attack Only

20/19 Subjects

20/21 Subjects

Due to

randomiza~ion

of treatments, the actual dis-

tribution did not replicate the
per cell.

proposed~number

of subjects

This difference is also due to division . of all

subjects by using a median split £or all self-esteem scores .

•

l
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The design provided final opinion scores for each of
the five message treatments:

supportive, refutational-

same> refutational-different, attack only,' and the neither
defense/nor attack condition.

The experiment covered two

sessions, the first devoted to the defenses; the second, to
strong attacks and to measuring the resultant belief
levels.

The present study was presented to subjects as

a verbal skills test.
Two basic types of defenses were used which differ 1n
the amount of threat:

"supportive" and "refutational."

The supportive defense was non-threatening; it .consisted
of giving the subject various a!guments in support of the
mod~rately

held belief.

The refutational defense was more

threatening; instead of positively

supporti~g

the belief,

it mentioned several arguments attacking the belief, and
then proceeded to refute those attacks.
The refutational defenses, considered 1n relation to
the subsequent attacks, were one of two types.

They

either mentioned and refuted the very arguments against
the belief that were · used in the subsequent attack, or
they mentioned and refuted arguments different from the
ones used in the attacks.

McGuire

(1964) tells us that

"this. refutational-same vs. refutational-different defense
variation is useful in determining whether any increased
resistance to persuasion derives from the . generalized
motivational effect of the threatening mention of the
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arguments against the belief, or whether it stems from the
useful defensive material provided directly by the
refutations (p. 202)."
· ·Ma teri'a1s
· Issues.

Two issues (relevant-non-relevant) were

selected on the basis of a previous study (Pryor, 1972).
The topics selected were the

followi~g:

"Vehicular Defects:

A Frequent Cause of Traffic Accidents" and "The Benefits
of Brushing Teeth after Every Meal," the latter being used
as non-relevant filler material.
Messages.

The experimental messages for all defensive

and attacking treatments replicated the McGuire format.
Two types of messages were used,
to defend and those

des~gned

includi~g

those

des~gned

to attack an existing belief.

The former, which McGuire (1964) calls immunizing messages,
consists of three paragraphs.

The first paragraph mentions

two "misleading" counterarguments against the belief,
while the second and third contain the refutations of these
two countera:rguments . .

To create refutational-same and

refutational-different defenses, two immunizing messages
were prepared on each belief.

That is, the attacking

messages used either the same or different arguments than
those previously refuted in the defensive treatment.

As

in McGuire's work, the supportive defenses consisted of
a statement about an issue, followed first by a paragraph
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containing two supportive arguments, then by two paragraphs,
each developing one of the arguments.
The attacking messages were

des~gned

to reduce belief

levels through strong arguments against a belief.

Similar

in structure to the immunizing messages, each contained
three paragraphs, the first of which briefly described two
attacks against the belief, while the
graphs strongly

elabor~t~d

followi~g

two para-

those counterarguments with

specific evidence for theiT validity.

All the

mess~ges,

both immunizing and strong counterarguing, were between
500 and 550 words in

le~gth

Mea surement Scales.

(see Appendix D).

A person's self-esteem affects

the evaluation he places on ~is performance in a particular
situation and the manner 1n which he behaves when in inter.action with others.

Self~esteem

concerns the amount of

value an individual
attributes to various facets of his
.
.
person and may be said to be affected by the success and
fail ures he has experienced in satisfying central needs.
It may be viewed as a function of the coincidence between
an individual's aspirations and his achievement of these
aspirations.

Therefore, the instrument for measur1ng

self-esteem was

des~gned

in accordance with this definition.

Self-esteem was operationally defined by Rosenbe!g's
modification of the Tennessee Self Concept Scale, which
measures three aspects of the self concept:
acceptance, and behavior.

identity,

Since it is more specific to
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current purposes, only one of the above clusters, selfacceptance, was used.

As Rosenberg (1965·) explains, one

connotation of high self-esteem is that a subject thinks
that he is "good---e-nough .. "

This concept

reflected in

lS

Rosenberg's modified scale for use in this study (see
Appendix A).
esteem

group~

Subjects were divided into high and low selfby using a median split.

Resis·tan·ce ·to· ·P ersuasion Measurem·e nt.

Initial op1n1ons

on moderately held beliefs (Pryor, 1972) were defined
using McGuire's

(1964) fifteen point scale.

Persuasion

was said to have occurred when an attacking message produced a significant decrease in mean belief level on the
15-point scale.

Operationally, resistance to persuasion

occurred when a defense-attack experimental treatment
produced a mean belief level significantly higher than
its corresponding attack-only treatment.

Each question-

naire contained seven questions of which four were relevant
and

thr~e

were non-relevant (see Appendix B).

A subject's

score on a given topic was the mean of his responses to
the four relevant items.

For example:

Only a small number of traffic accidents 1n the U. S. are
attributable to vehicle failures.
/

·1

I 2 I

·3

Def1n1tely
False

I

'4

I

·5·

I

·6

Probably
False

I

·7

I

8

I

Uncerta1n

I 10 I '11. I 1·2 I ·t3 / 1·4 I 15 I
Probab.ly
True

9

Def1n1tely
True

I
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Administration.

To minimize suspicion concern1ng the

self-concept and attitude measures the sessions were listed
on a weekly training schedule as "S-2" (intelligence) and
counter-intelligence operations.
In each experimental session, the instructions on the
cover page of each test booklet were read aloud.

Subjects

were told that the "essays have been prepared by a research
team at the Institute for . Social Research and are designed
to test reading skills.''

· subjects in ail sessions were

instructed to read each par~graph, then go back and underline its crucial clause.

Five minutes were allotted to the

completion of each essay, three minutes for the 12-item
attitude questionnaire.

The' same instructions were repeated

at the beginning of the follow-up sessions in delayed
measure treatments .
.Subjects were told that all answers they gave would be
held in strict confidence, and that there would be no way
for their answers to be traced back to them.
Each subject received one· of five different booklets
on random basis.

The different types of booklets are

diagramed as follows:
Type

I:

(Neither/Nor) I Cover I Self-Esteem
Questionnaire I Filler Questionnaire I
Filler Material I Filler Material I
Relevant Questionnaire.

Type II: · (Attack Only) Cover I Self-Esteem Question- .
naire I Filler Questionnaire / Filler Material
Relevant Attack I Relevant Questionnaire.

I
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Type III:

Type

Type .

IV:

V:

( Refu t ational-Same) Cover I Self-Esteem
Questionnaire I Filler Questionnaire I
Refutational-Same Defense I Relevant
Attack I Relevant Questionnaire.
(Refutational-Different) Cover I SelfEsteem Questionnaire / · Filler Question- ·rraire I Refutational-Different Defense ' I
Relevant Attack I Reievant Question~aire
., . .
(Suppor~i..ve) ·coyer

I

~elf-Esteem Ques.tion-.

naire I ~=-Filler Quest~onnaire I Supportive
Defense \ j Re;lev-ant Attack~ I Relevant
·-·
Questionnaire.

'

After the subjects had finished all sections and the
booklets were collected, a general debriefing and questiona n swer period was held.

The subjects were again assured

th at all answers they gave would .be held in confidence.

Subjects were di yided into

h~gh

and low ·self-esteem

gr ou ps by using a median split of their mean scores on the
s elf -este em test.

Scores on the self-esteem test were

comp uted by adding the twenty separate indicators and
dividing by twenty to achieve an average score for each
subject.
Final belief levels were computed by obtaining the
mean of an individual's responses on the 15 point scales.
A 3 x 2 factorial analysis of variance was used to measure
the main and interaction effects of types of defenses and
levels of self-esteem (see Table 1).

A 2 x 2 factorial

analysis was used for the control measurements (see Table 2).
In all cases, follow-up t tests were used to isolate
simple effects when warranted by analysis of variance results.

.,

.

Results
The mean belief levels produced by each treatment in
relation to self-esteem scores form the data of this study.
Belief levels were defined as ·a subject's score along the
15-point continuum.

P~rsuasion

may b~ said to have occurred

when an attacking message produced a significant decrease
in mean belief level on the 15-point scale.· Operationally,
resistance to persuasion occurred when a defense-attack
experimental treatment produced a mean belief level significantly higher than its corresponding attack-only treatment.
A subject's score was computed as the mean of his responses
to the four relevant items.
examined in Appendix B.

The questionnaire may be

Mean belief levels for each

treatment are summarized 1n Table 3.
TABLE 3
Mean Belief Levels Produced by All Treatments
Type of Defense

Subjects with High Subjects it
- Self-Esteem.
Self-Este

Neither/Nor

8.20· (24)*

6.9

Attack-Only

3.36 (19)

3.

Supportive

7.92 (21)

6

Refutational-Same

7.17

Refutational-Different

7.15 (18)

C+-8)

*Indicates number of subjects per ce
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Table 3 shows that the mean belief level in the low selfesteem condition was 6.92 with no attack and no defense
(neither/nor) and 3.90 with an attack-only.
self-esteem

co!l~_i_tion

the

. _ g~oup

For the high

mean for neither/nor was

8.20 and 3.36 for attack-only.
Self-esteem levels are defined as a subject's mean
score of 20 items along a 7-point continuum.
nalre may be found

i~ App~ndix

A.

The question-

Mean self-esteem scores

ranged from 7.00 (High) to 3.10 (Low).

The median split

for all (200) self-esteem scores occurred at 5.70.

Mean

self-esteem scores for each cell are reflected in Table 4.
TABLE 4
Mean Self-Esteem Level for Each Condition
Subjects with High Subjects with Low
Self-Esteem
Self-Esteem

Condition

Neither/Nor

6.28 (24)*

5.10 (16)

Attack-Only

6.47 (19)

5.12 (21)

Supportive
Refutational-Same

6.19 (21)
6.24 (18)

5.02 (19)
4.96 (22)

Refutational-Different

6.16 ( 18)

4.99 ( 2 2)

*Indicates number of subjects per cell
In order to

exam~ne

the immunizing effects of the

three types of defenses on subsequent attacks, it was
necessary that these attacks significantly reduce initial
belief levels.

If an attack were ·Unsuccessful, the value

of a defense would be questionable.

Table 5 contains an
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analysis of variance of the neither-nor/attack-only data
from Table 2 in a 2 x 2 design.
TABLE 5
Analysis of Variance of Attack-Only and
Neither/Nor Data on Initial Beliefs
Source of
Variation

ss

Level of SelfEsteem (A)
Attack (B)
A X B
Within Cell
F.99 (1-76)

=

MS

df

p

F

2.52

1

2. 52.

0.29

299.84

1

299.84

34.07

16.31

1

16.31

1.85

669.11

76

8.80

<. 01

7.08

The main effect of the attack factor (Table 5) compares
the initial belief level
only conditions.

(ne~ther/nor)

Individual t

and the attack-

tests performed between t e

neither/nor and attack-only means with each level of se festeem produced t ratios significant at the p

~

.01 leve

for both high self-esteem groups and low self-esteem
groups.

The interaction between self-esteem level and

attack factors was non-significant.

In summary, the

significantly reduced initial belief levels for both
esteem levels.
Analysis of var1ance was also used to exarn1ne
effects of level of self-esteem, ~ype defense, an
action in a 3 x 2 design.
Table 6.

The results are re

,

TABLE 6
Main and Interaction Eff ct fo
Treatments Involving a Defe s a.
3
Source of
· Variation

ss

d

Level of Self Esteem (A)
Defense

6. 4

Treatments (B)

4.36

AXB

2

33.66

"/ i thin Cell

11••1177

1,633.88

F.95 (1-114)
F.95 (2 - 114)

=
=

1

.are r e

e four research questions:
1.

Vfu at is the relat;io s ; i
persuasion and genera~

e
se- f - es~~·~u~

fur:

Analysis of var1ance co
we igh ted- means wit

a

ce 1 f

re ve al a significant· F ratio

e

u

ne

s up port previo s repor·s of a
be tween se f-estee
t

ot occu r as a

and de fe s e type.
2..

\ at type of d efe se
estee indi id a s ~
pers asion for

o exam1ne t ese
o

ers as

and

at interactions did

es tee

1

4.

3.92
3.07

The results which follo
t

• 41

~

g co

ar1so

es

l.

s

rr..a.tr

.
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test was selected as the appropriate statistical me t o
The more stringent two-tailed tests were employed s i ce
direction predictions were involved.
Altho~gh

there appeared to be no significant linea

relationship, there is some evidence that the refutatio a same seems to be the best suited defense for low se f esteem subjects.

Table 3 illustrates that the refuta-4-io a -

same (8.57) is also higher (p <.10, t test) than t h e
corresponding neither/nor . (6.92) conditi.on.

1'1hile t e

refutational-same defense (8 .·s 7) did not produce a s1 g

:1 -

ficantly higher mean belief level than the refutation a different (8.14), it did approach significance (p<.l
t

test) in relation to the mean belief level produce d b

the supportive defense (6.88).
All three defenses
t

test)

h~gher

~reduced

a significant y (

<

mean level of belief than the corres

attack-only (3.90) condition.

Thus, for the

o 4 se £-

esteem subjects all three defense types produce

to persuasion accordini to the operational defi
resistance.
3.

What type of defense is best suite

esteem individuals for moderately , e
The supportive

~efense

f r
e

g

se

1..

!

(7.92) appears to

suited defense condition for high self-estee
(see Table 3).
a

The supportive defense

significantly higher ( .15 /p

> . 10,

( 7.9~

t test:

belief than the correspond1ng refutationa -s

]
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refutational-different (7.15).

All three defenses produced

a significantly higher (p< .01, t

test) mean level of belief

than the corresponding attack-only (3.36) condition.
as with low

self~esteem

Thus,

subjects, resistance to per-

suasion was produced by all the defense types for the high
self-esteem subjects.
4.

Of supportive, refutational-same, and refutationaldifferent, which defense is .best suited . for all
subjects combined for moderately held beliefs?

The highest grand mean level of belief .was produced
by the mean of the refutational-same defenses (7.87).

This

mean level of belief is higher than the grand mean for all
six defensive conditions combined (7.67). · Refutationaldifferent and supportiye defenses grand mean belief levels
were 7.65 and 7.40 respectively.

All defense . grand mean

belief levels were significantly (p<.Ol, t

test) higher

than the corresponding . grand mean belief level for the
attack-only (3.63) condition . .
Although the refutational-same defense appears to be
the best suited for all self-esteem levels, it is essential
to reiterate that, even though it is the best defense
condition for low self-esteem subjects, it is not as
effective as the supportive defense for high
subjects.

self-est~em

Thus, when levels of self-esteem are combined,

there appears to be little or no difference 1n the
resistance-conferri~g

efficacy between defense types.

Discussion
Discussion of the results is accomplished by treating
each research - question separately.
1.

What is the relationship between resistance to
persuasion and general self-esteem?

In contrast to Janis (1959), level of self-esteem was
not a reliable predictor of persuasibility.

According to

previous studies, it would be predicted that low selfesteem subjects would score lower in the attack-only
condition than the high self-esteem subjects.

This is

based upon the often cited theory that self-esteem and
persuasibility form an inverse relationship.

Yet, in this

study the low self-esteem subjects scored higher (3.90)
than the high self-esteem subjects (3.36).

Though the

difference between these figures did not reach statistical
significance, they not only do not replicate previous
research, but also appear to reveal a reverse trend.
Further support for such a trend is seen in the comparative
belief level depreciation from the neither-nor to the
attack-only treatments for the two levels of self-esteem.
While high self-esteem subjects dropped from 8.20 to 3.36,
a drop of 4.84, low self-esteem subjects decreased from
6.92 to 3.90, a drop of only 3.02 (see Table 3).
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In the current study, any prior defense was significantly
(p <.OS, t test) advantageous in maintaining the initial
belief level for all subjects.

Inoculation theory would

predict that t .he -refutational defenses would produce more
resistance than the supportive defense.

However, for high

self-esteem subjects, supportive (7.92) appeared to represent the best defense, though it was not significantly.
(.lO<p<.lS, t

test) superior to the refutational-same
.
.
(7.17) or refutational-differ·ent ·. (7..15) defenses. · This

deviant result may be directly attributed to the use of
moderate beliefs used in this study in comparison with .
McGuire's use of cultural truisms.

McGuire (196la, p. 332)

recognized the limitation of cultural truisms:
Had the beliefs been controversial rather than
truisms, the subject~ would have been more practiced
in defending them, and, hence, would have participated
more effectively in the active defense conditions and
would have been less in need of a threatening defense
stimulating pre-exposure.
Had the issues been less
involving than these health ones, there would have
been more to gain, in regard to motivating the .
subject to pay adequate attention to the material
from requiring his active participation in ~he
defense.
Hence, with different types of issues we
would expect resulting differences not only in the
size of the obtained results, but even in the
directions.
Pryor (1972) reasoned that subjects should already
possess a level of awareness regarding the vulnerabilities
of their middle-range beliefs, and would therefore be able
to conjure arguments in its defense.

Pryor (1972) predicted

that the supportive defense would confer a significant
amount of resistance to attack for moderately held beliefs.
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Although he obtained only m1nor support, the supportive
defense did reduce the effects of the attack to a nonsignifjcant level.
Braden (1962) reported that the refutational was not
super1or to the ·- ~upportive defense in inducing resistance.
However, Pryor (1972) stated ~hat Braden's repiication of
McGuire's procedures was not precise and that such methodological differences may have led to her variant findings
on the supportive defense.
The superiority of the supportive defense for high
self-esteem subjects 1s reported by Cohen (1959) when he
asserted that subjects of high self-esteem appeared to be
less respons1ve to outside influence and were characterized
by a preference for defenses which help · them ignore challenging defenses and

conflicti~g

communication.

Cohen (1959)

also reported that subjects with low self-esteem show a
preference for more expressive and

challengi~g

defenses.

Further support for this ·reasoning was reported by Leventhal and Perloe

(1962), . ~hen

they stated that high self-

esteem subjects tended to change more towards optimistic
(supportive, 7.92) communications than pessimistic
(refutational-same, 7.17; refutational-different, 7.15) ones,
while low esteem subje·cts showed the opposite tendencies for
optimistic (supportive, 6.88) communications and pessimistic
(refutational-same, 8.57; refutational-different, 8.14)
communications.

It seems logical to postulate that the

supportive defense, which contains only belief-supporting
information, 1s more optimistic than the refutational defenses .
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This study suggests that there is not a positive
linear relationship between resistance to persuasion and
self-esteem.

To the extent that resistance to persuasion

is the mirr0r image of persuasibility, the results contradict
the common notion - of an inverse linear relationship between
persuasibility and self-esteem.
Gollob and Dittes (1965) reasoned that the findings
of increased

p~rsuasibility

for those with lower self-

esteem probably depended on specific characteristics of the
communication.

By varying crucial aspects of the communlca-

tion, such as threat and message complexity, they predicted
varying relationships between self-esteem and persuasibility.
Cox and Bauer (1964) suggested that the linear relationship
previously reported among male subjects required modification.

The results of their study showed that under some

conditions subjects with very low self-esteem actually
became counter-persuasible.
reported that their

resu~ts

Gollob and Dittes (1965) also
provided little illumination

concerning comparisons between persuasibility and selfesteem.

Measures of self-esteem were not significantly re-

lated to any of the opinion measures.

Finally, their

"results emphasize that self-esteem may affect persuasibility
through differential '.learning' of the communication as
well as through the more commonly considered process of
the 'acceptance' of the communication (p. 200)."
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2.

What type of defense is best suited for low selfesteem individuals to accomplish resistance to
persuasion for moderately held beliefs?

According to the definition of

~esistance

used by

McGuire and also in this study, resistance occurs when a
defense-attack condition produces a mean belief level
significantly higher than its corresponding attack-only
treatment.

In this sense, resistance occurred under all

defense conditions for 1 subjects of low self-esteem.
As mentioned previous.ly, McGuire (1964) reported the
superiority of the refutational form of defenses over
supportive for cultural truisms.

Pryor (1972) offers some

support that the same may be true of moderately held beliefs.
In the current study, although the corresponding mean belief
levels for the refutational defenses are in the expected
direction, significant differences were not observed among
the three.
It is interesting to note that, although all three
defenses achieved significantly (p< .OS, t test) higher
mean belief levels than their corresponding attack-only
treatments, only refutational-same (8.57) and refutationaldifferent (8.14) produced mean belief levels higher than
the corresponding neither/nor (6.92) condition.

The dif-

ference between refutational-sarne and the neither/nor control
approached significance (p <.10, t test) while the
refutational-different (p< .30, t test) condition does not.
The supportive condition (6.88) produced a slightly lower
mean .lev..el .than the· neither/n.o r. condition.

Thus, of the
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three defenses, a form of refutational defenses appears to
be best suited for individuals of low self-esteem.

These

results are in line with the previous research reported above.
Another

p~s.~ible

explanation for the results obtained

from low self-esteem subjects occurs as a direct relation
to their initial belief level.

Since the low self-esteem

neither/nor condition was below 7.0
actually scored in the

"~lightly

(6.92), subjects

disagree"

cat~gory.

Pryor

(1972) speculated that "de.fenses which attempt to increase
the level of belief on topics which rank low in initial
belief level may be viewed as counter-attitudinal in nature
(p. 25)."

Thus, the defenses for low self-esteem could

probably be defined as counter-attitudinal.

Unlike cultural

truisms, subjects were probably not motivated to defend
these beliefs as a result . of threatening mention of arguments, such as conferred by the refutational defenses.

It

is possible that motivation could be derived as a result
of a weak form of

diss~nance

counter-attitudinal defenses.

caused by reading the slightly
Researchers have reported

that when insufficient rewards or punishments are given for
engaging in counter-attitudinal acts, dissonance may be
reduced by attitude change in the direction advocated in
the counter-attitudinal message (Aronson and Carlsmith,
1963; Cohen and Brehm, 1962; Freedman, 1965; and Nuttin,

196 6) .
Counter-attitudinal advocacy may have caused attitude
change in the direction of advocation due to the subject's

inability to justify or rationalize his
counter-attitudinal act.

participa t~

This may partially exvlai

t

finding that - for low self-esteem subjects, two of t
defense types (refutational-same and refutational -d
produced mean belief levels appreciably higher t h an
initial control belief level.
3.

What type of d'e fense is best suited for ig s
esteem individuals for moderately held b e l ,· fs ..

Resistance to persuasion also occurred under al .
defense conditions (p<.Ol~ t tests) for subjects
self-esteem.

f

However, unlike the low self-estee

the high self-esteem subjects seemed to benefit mo
the supportive defense condition (7.92) as oppos e
refutational-same (7.17) or .refutational-differe t
defense conditions.

Although the correspond1ng

levels did not occur as Mc.Guire might have sus
Table 3), statistically significant (.15>p/
differences were not observed among the three
It is also conceivable that moderately

e

as defined in this current study and by Pryor · (
are more ego-involving than the cultural t
McGuire (1964).

It is suggested that more e

topics may have motivated subjects to defe
beliefs, thus rendering the supportive defe
more effectiv.e.

This reasoning is in li e

reported by Pryor (1972).

Another

princ~pal

difference is

o ~e ,

e ·
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between the mean belief level of the neither/nor co ndition
and the mean belief levels of the three defen s e - conditions.
Whereas, the two refutational defenses for low se lfesteem

subject~

_produced mean belief levels high e r th an the

corresponding neither/nor condition, none of t h e defe nse
conditions for subjects with high self-esteem ( s upportive
7.92, refutational-same 7.17 and refutational- diff e rent
7.15) attained or exceeded the mean belief lev e l in the
neither/nor condition (8.20).

There does not a ppear to be

a defense which is clearly a best suited condit ion for high
self-esteem subjects.

4.

Of supportive, refutational-same, an d r efutationaldifferent, which defense is the best s uited for
all subjects combin~4 for moderatel y h e ld beliefs?

McGuire's research has repeatedly de monstrate d.that
the refutational-same defense condition rank s as the most
effective immunizer, followed by the refutati on a l - different
and supportive defense conditions in that or der .

Combining

the six means produced by all defense conditi ons i n this
study, a grand defense mean of 7.67 is obtaine d .

The grand

mean produced by the · refutational-same condit ion s is 7.87.
The corresponding grand mean for the refutat i onal-different
defenses is 7.65, and for the supportive d efen s e s it is

7.40.

The refutational-same defense has t h e only grand

mean . greater than the overall grand mean.

Thus ; these

grand means produced mean belief levels wh ich are 1n the
same order the inoculation theory would pre d ict.

In

--
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addition, Pryor (1972) reports the identical trend occurs
for initially low and moderately-held beliefs . .
In light of McGuire's (1964), Pryor's (1972) and the
current study, it seems reasonable to conclude that the
practitioner is best advised to employ the refut~tional
same defense technique as a belief-maintaining device.
This defense appears to be . the most successful if selfesteem is unknown, as is usually the case.
A large within cell variance of meart belief levels may
have contributed to some of the non-significant results.
A possible reason for this

~arge

variance is that several

of the test booklets were returned with the appearance
of deliberate

mismarki~gs

However, a separate
deleti~g

and a few profane remarks. '

a~alysis

of variance was accomplished,

those particular - booklets, and the results did

not differ from thQse reported.

Another plausible expla-

nation for the large variance of scores is the wide range
of

intell~gence,

income, age, and sociometric status of

·the subjects examined in the current study.

However, this

is not a plausible basis for assuming that the same results
would not occur under similar conditions if replicated.
Perhaps certain departures from the McGuire procedures
contribute to the lack of significant differences between
defense types.

The current experiment employed independent

control groups for comparison with experimental group data.
McGuire (1964) rotated subjects around treatments, with
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each subject supplying either experimental or control data
on all issues.

While McGuire employed anywhere from 24 to

80 subjects per cell in his experiments, the current study
used approximatelr 20 subjects per cell.
that a

~arger

It is possible

sample would have produced results

eve~

more

consistent with inoculation theory since with a larger
sample a small difference 1s more likely to show up as
significant.
Finally, it is perhaps unreasonable to expect a trait
o f personality to correlate with persuasibility to such a
high degree that the individual would respond with agreement
to any statement on any topic emanating from any source.
For example, regardless of differences in personality
traits, strong presstire may move everyone in the direction
of intended influence.

On the other hand, if the pressure

i s weak, and explicit demands are not made on the individual,
then relevant

personali~y

traits might produce greater

differences in observed behavior.
This study obviously needs replication with attention
paid to such potentially relevant variables as

ego~

involvement, controversial beliefs, and message intensity.
The present study is .no exception to the rule that research
generates more questions than it answers.

Summary
The purpose of this investigation was to determine the
relationship between resistance to persuasion and generalized
self-esteem.

Resistance was studied as a function of pre-

treatments which, when administered to a receiver, would
render him less susceptible

t6

persuasive messages than

he was found to be without these pretreatments.

The

research design followed the McGuire inoculation theory
paradigm, except that moderately-held beliefs were used
instead of cultural truisms as topics.
In order to examine this phenomenon, an experimental
group (3 x 2 design) and a control group (2 x 2) was
employed.

The experimental group was divided into high and

low self-esteem groups, via median split of self-esteem
scores, with each subject randomly receiving one of the
three defensive conditicns:
different or supportive.

refutational-same, refutational-

The control group, also divided

into high and low self-esteem groups, received an attackonly or a neither defense, nor attack condition.
Analysis of variance did not reveal a
ratio for main and interaction effects.

significant~F

Hence, the data

did not support previous reports of an inverse linear
relationship between self-esteem and persuasibility.
39
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There was some evidence that the refutational-same
defensive condition was the best suited defense . for low
self-esteem subjects, while the supportive defensive condition appeared superior for high self-esteem subjects.
---

Although . the refutational-same defense appears to
superior defense for all subjects

combin~d,

b~

the

there does not

appear to be a significant difference in the resistanceconferring efficacy between defense types for moderatelyheld beliefs.
The relationship between resistance to persuasion and
generalized self-esteem seems to support Cohen's (1959)
interaction hypothesis, rather .than a generalized form of
the simpler hypothesis of an ·inverse linear relationship
between esteem and
(1954) and Janis

pe~suasibility

& Field

reported by Janis

{1959), and Janis and Rife (1959).

Cohen (1959) proposed that other personality factors
_interact with self-esteem to produce communication outcomes.
This study does not demonstrate a generalized relationship
between self-esteem and persuasibility.
We should avoid . generalization based on the data
reported in this study until future replication by other
researchers.

Many statistically insignificant trends were

obtained, including statistically insignificant reversals
from predicted associations.
The results are consistent with the theory that those
of high and low

self-e~teem

have different defensive

orientation (Hovland and Janis, 1966).

These researchers
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speculated that high self-esteem subjects tend to

~gnore

or avoid confrontations, while low self-esteem subjects are
more likely to be receptive to anxiety-provoking messages.
The fact that

t~~ _ supportive

defenses produced the highest

l

mean belief level for the high self-esteem subjects and
the lowest for the low self-esteem subjects is in line with
this reasoning.
The results of this .study indicate that differences
1n self-esteem are associated with considerable differences
1n an individual's responses to external pressures.

Self-

esteem seems to mediate stimulus and response much the same
as a lens

m~ght

mediate the perception of an object.

Additional research is needed to determine that if 1n a
mass persuasion situation, once opinion

ch~ge

has occurred

a nd new .information or petsuasion has been accepted,
regress1on over a period of time and under the pressure of
ordinary events would occur differentially with regard to
self-esteem.

APPENDIX A
SELF-ESTEEM QUESTIONNAIRE
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Self-Esteem Questionnaire
Below 1s a ser1es of statements.

Indicate how you

feel about each by circling the appropriate numbers.

For

example, number 1 indicates very strong agreement with the
statement, number 4 indicates neutral feelings, and number 7
indicates very strong disagreement.
DISAGREE
1.

I feel that I am a person of worth,
at least on an equal plane with
others . . . .
. . . .
. .

.

.

.

. . .

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

2.

I am an attractive person

3.

feel that I have a number of good
qualities
. . . . . . . .

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

I like to look n1ce and neat all
the time . . . ... .. . . . . .

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

All ln all, I am inclined to feel
that I am a failure .
.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

4.

5.

I

.

.

.

.. ..

6•

I have a lot of self-control

7•

I am able to do things as well as
most other people
. • . •

.

. .

8.

I am popular with women

9•

I feel I do not have much to be
proud of
.

10.
11.

12.
13.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

. . . .

.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

. .

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

. .

1

I like my looks just the way
they are .
.
. .

. . .

. .

. . . . .

I take a positive attitude toward
myself
. . . . . . . .
. .

.

.

. .

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

.

z

3 4 5 6 7

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1

z

3 4 5 6 7

I would like to cha~g~ some parts
of my body . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 Z 3 4 5 6 7

On the whole, I am satisfied with
myself . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 Z 3 4 5 6 7
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AGREE

14.
15.
16.

I am not the person I would like
to be . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I wish I could have more respect
for myself . . .. • .
.

. . . . . .

18.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

.

•

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

I can always take care of myself
any s it u at i on . . . . · . . . . .

. .

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

At times I think I am no good
at all . . . .
. . . .

.

•

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

. . . . . .

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

I try to change when I know I'm
I

wro~g

certainly feel useless at times.

1. n

19.
20.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

. .

doing things that are

17.

n·ISAGREE

.

. .

I find it hard to · talk. with
strangers . .
. . .

.

.

/
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Everyone should see his doctor at least once a year.
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Compared to other factors of accident causation, vehicle defects are of little consequence.
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traffic accidents in the U. S. are -attributable to vehicle failures.

Everyone should brush his teeth
1 I 2 I ·3 ·1 4· I s· I
Definitely/ .Prooaoly
False

Only a small number
1 I 2 I

o~inion

Please respond to each of the following statements by indicating your o~~ s~~sonal
of the statement's truth, regardless of whether your opinion agrees or · isagrees
w1th some or all of the material read in this test. Answer the questions in t~e order
presented, and do · not skip any question. Work rapidly, as only three minutes are allowed
for answering all questions.

We are interested in determining the extent to which the reading comprehension score
obtained in this test is affected by the person's feeling about the topics discussed.
Hence, we here ask you to indicate your personal feelings about the truth of the statements listed below by circling the one number that best indicates your judgment of the
truth of that statement. Notice that the larger the number the more true the statement
is judged; the smaller the number the more false it is judged.

(Attitude Questionnaire:

harmful practice, if one does it
I 7 I 8 I 9 I 10 I 11 I 12
nee rtain 1
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Vehicle malfunctions are a minor contributor to
1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5. I. ~ I 7 I 8 I 9
Definitely 1 Probably I Uncertain
False

y

Brushing one's teeth can be~ome
3 I 4 I 5 I

problem in the .U.S.
15

If automobiles on U. S. roads were 100% free of defects, the number of traffic accidents
would still not be substantially reduced.
1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I 6 I 7 I 8 I 9 I
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Compared to other factors of accident causation, vehicle defects are of great ccnsequence.
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Everyone should brush his teeth after every meal if at all possible.

Def1n1tely
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A large number of traffic accidents in the U. S. are attributable to vehicle failure.

Please respond to .each of the following statements by indicating your own ~ersonal
opinion of the statement's truth, regardless of whether your opinion agrees 1orisagrees
w1th some or all of the material read in this test. Answer the questions in - the order
presented, and do not skip any question. Work rapidly, as only three minutes are
allowed for answering all que~tinns.

We are interested in determining the extent to which the reading comprehension score
obtained in this test is affected by the person's feeling about the topics discussed.
Hence, we here ask you to indicate your personal feelings about the truth of the statements ·listed below by circling the one number that best indicates your judgment of the
truth of that statement. Notice that the larger the number, the more true the statement
is judged; the smaller the number the more f~lse it is judged.

(Attitude Questionnaire:
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Vehicle malfunctions .are a .. major .contributor to the traffic safety problem in the U. S.
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If the automobiles on U. S. roads were 100 % free of defects, the number of traffic
accidents would be substantially reduced.
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(Supportive Defense:
Vehicular Defects:

Medium-Range Belief)

A Frequent Cause of Traffic Accidents

.
Research on_traffic safety has received vastly
1ncreased attent1on over the past two decades. Previous
to 1950, little _ ~as known about accident causation. However, the ~ve~ incre~sing annual highway accident figures
have made 1t 1mperat1ve that both government agencies and
private industry work toward a solution to the traffic
accident problem.
Research programs, funded largely by
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
and the auto manufacturers, were initiated . with the belief
that traffic safety could best be improved by the application of scientific and quantitative methods, both to the
study of the accident problem, and to the study of remedies
for it. The findings of the past twenty years cite many
causes for the traffic accident problem. A highly fre- .
quent contributor has proven to be vehicular malfunctions.
Each day thousands of automobiles are mass produced on
Detroit assembly lines and scattered to dealerships across
thB country. An alarmingly high percentage of these cars
leave the factories with at least one defective part.
Unfortunately, this is only the beginning of the problem.
Few car owners take a preventive approach to automobile
~aintenance.
Instead, they wait until they are without
transportation, due· to a damaged or worn out part, to
visit the repair garage.
It is the rare car buyer who is not forced to return
to the dealership within weeks of his purchase for adjustments or repairs on his shiny new machine.
Since most
people are still envelop ~ d with pride over the looks and
performance of the new car, the inconvenience caused by
this early visit to the · service department is quickly
forgotten.
On the other hand, individuals who have been
caused more than inconvenience are less likely to forget.
The highest percentage of unit defects in mass produced
automobiles occurs with cars built on Mondays and Fridays,
when partying and drinking practices affect the highest
number of both blue and white collar workers. Recent
studies involving examinations of late model cars involved
in fatal accidents, have indicated that many crashes
heretofore attributed to careless or reckless driving, may
have been caused by vehicular defects such as brake failure,
a loose steering rod bolt, etc. Arthur Little's recent
book entitled The State . of The Art of Traffi~ Safet~
reports that "In sp1te of the 1nCiustry 1 s effort, de ective
vehicles are produced and sold. He noted further_ th~t all
32 cars tested by NHTSA in 1968, showed trouble w1th1n the
first 5,000 miles of driving."
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The best method of preventing accidents caused by
vehicular defects is by replacing old or badly worn parts.
Unfortuantely, such a preventive approach to highway
safety is seldom taken in today's world of high repair
costs and limited time available to properly maintain an
automobile.
For most Americans, it is time to bring the
car to a repair shop only when it has stopped running.
Mosely (1963) studJ.ed in detail over one-hundred fatal
accidents in the Boston area and concluded that "many
'accidents' are due to vehicular failures." He pointed to
accidents in which cars were improperly repaired and others
in which the lack of preventive maintenance was instrumental.
Typically, Americans drive with brakes which have lost
SO% of their efficiency. In 1969, the State of Illinois
asked dealers and garages. to inspect the brake systems on
cars brought in for other ~ork.
Out of 494 vehicles
inspected, 336 (68%) showed at least one brake defect.
Since defects of some sort are to be expected in any massproduced item on a statistical basis, and since individual
parts of any machine do wear out with use, preventive
maintenance is a necessary practice if we are to decrease
the high number of traffic accidents caused by vehicular
malfunctions.
·

so
(Refutational Defense:
Vehicular Defects:

Medium-Range Belief)

A Frequent Cause of .Traffic Accidents

Over the past two decades traffic safety research
programs, funded largely by government agencies such as
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
and by the ·automobile industry, have made great progress
in the study of accident causation. The findings of the
past twenty years have done much to clarify the relative
roles of human and vehicular factors in traffic accidents.
As a result of this research, it is now known that vehicular factors are a highly frequent contributor to traffic
accidents.
Unfortunately, there have been occasional
articles in the press whi~h argue that v~hicular defects
do not play a major role in the traffic accident problem.
Before our ever increasing traffic ~roblems can begin to
be solved, it is necessary that the American public be
informed of what research ·scientists have learned about
accident causation. Thus, it is important to review
misleading and distorted information.
It has been claimed,
for example, that "human factors," driving while under the
influence of alcohol and dri~ing too fast, are the primary
causes of traffic accidents.
Some critics have cited the
low number of vehicular causes of traffic accidents
reported in police department annual statistical summaries.
Let us examine the fallacies inherent in each of these
arguments.
To argue that drunk driving and excessive speed are
the primary causes of accidents is to ignore the body of
research findings gathered in controlled studies of
accidents.
These investigations show unequivocally that
drunk driving and spee4ing are responsible for on1y a
small percentage of traffic accidents.
For example,
Borkenstein (1968) studied 5,987 accidents on Michigan
roadways and concluded that only 3.2 percent of the_drivers
had blood alcohol concentrations equal to or exceed1ng the
legal limit.
Speeding was cited as a causal factor in an
even smaller percentage of these accidents.
Further, the
assertion that humans are to blame for accidents by no
means conflicts with the "human factor" theory. Vehicular
defects are caused by · humans who build cars, and are
caused and perpetuated by humans who fail to proper~y
maintain their cars. While it is important to real1ze
that many factors contribute to the total ~raffic a~cident
problem, we cannot afford to ignore the_ev1dence wh1ch
points to vehicular malfunctions as a h1ghly frequent
contributor to highway crashes.
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Another example of a misleading argument against
recent findings is that police department annual statistical summaries do not show a high incidence o·f vehicular
failures in traffic accidents. This is certainly not a
surprising finding since police officers who are called
to the scene of an accident are neither mechanics, nor
are they require~ to inspect the individual parts of the
cars. The·ir p·r 1.m ary purposes are to attend to the injured,
clear the roadway, restore normal traffic flow, and file
a concise report of the participation of each driver and
passenger involved in the accident. Reporting of vehicular
defects is done only when such defects are obvious, such
as blown-out tires.
Since in most cases the assignment
of fault determines financial responsibility for damage
and injury~ police officers are often reluctant to label
even obvious vehicle defects as causal unless they have
personally witnessed the accident. When police officers
do report vehicular defects, it is usually within the
context of the testimony _of a driver, passenger, or
witness.
Thus, in the vast majority of accidents, no
attempt is made to check for vehicular causes.
It is
not, therefore, surprising that police summaries fail to
accurately reflect the findings of recent controlled
research.
·

.

(
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(Attack-Same:
The Automobile:

Medium-Range Belief}

An Infrequent Cause of Traffic Accidents

In light of ~~ch controversy regarding the causes of
o~r increasing tiaffic accident problem, iecent ihvestigatlons ha~e attempted to plac~ the various contributing
f a ctors 1nto proper perspect1ve. To the surprise of few
researchers, the factors of driving while under the influence
of alcohol and excessive speed ha~e proven to be the two
most frequent contributors to traffic accidents. Despite
the assertions of some independent research groups
vehictilar factors do not · appear to be a frequent c~use
of accidents.
This can be seen in the low percentage of
vehicular failures cited in national summaries of police
dep a rtment statistics on accident causation. Because it
i s important that everyon~ who drives a motor vehicle
understands the causes of our growing traffic safety problem, it is useful to examine in detail the evidence which
has l~d professional researchers to isolate human factors,
driving under the influence of alcohol, and speeding, as
the most common contributors.to traffic crashes.
For several years·, professional researchers have
the orized that the ariver~ the human factor, is the primary
s ource o f our traffic ac~ident problem.
The U. S. Departme n t of Transportation (DOT) and the automobile industry
h a ve responded to the need for research funds necessary
t o e xplore the role of human factors in traffic crashes.
In 1969, DOT appropriated over 100 million dollars to
f inance alcohol safety ~ction programs in 40 U. S. cities.
The projects were designed in part to define the role of
alcohol in traffic crashes.
By early 1970, initial results
began to accumulate in Washington.
National aver~ge~
indicated that in approximately 55% of all fatal acc1dents,
at least one of the drivers had · a measurable blood alcohol
content.
The smallest ratio of alcohol involvement was
reported in Denver, Colorado, where 34% of the crashes
showed at least one driver who had been drinking. While
statistics involving non-fatal crashes were not quite as
high, they left no do.ubt that alcohol is a primary con-.
tributing factor to our traffic accident probl~m.
Rank1ng
a close second is another human factor, excess1ve speed.
As in the case of alcohol, the more serious the accident,
the greater the · likelihood that speeding was a contributor.
Together, the human factors of alcohol and speeding account
for the majority of traffic crashes.

53

A second source of da~a which serves to c+arify the
role of vehicular malfunct1ons in accident causation is
the annual nationwide summary of accident statistics
compiled by individual · police departments and published
by the National Safety Council.
In 1970, less than 3%
of all reported a~~idents were found related to vehicular
defects.
Further, the Na~ional Safety Council asked
officers in 144 police departments across the country to
complete a short questionnaire on each accident. The
questionnaire asked for the officer's opinion of the
causes of the accident. The data were collected 1n a
completely anonymous manner, identifying neither the accid e nt participants nor the officer, thus removing the threat
o f use of the information as court evidence by one of the
i n volved parties.
Since the police officers could thereby
f reely evaluate and report all possible causes, it is
significant that results showed only a statistically
·tr ivial increase over the national average in the percentage
o f accidents attributed to vehicular failure.
These and
other recently ·recorded data provide convincing evidence
t h at vehicular malfunctions play an insignificant role in
our traffic ~ccident problem.
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(Attack-Different:
The Automobile:

Medium-Range Belief)

An Infrequent Cause of Traffic Accidents

In light of m~ch controversy regarding the causes of
o~r increasing tr~ffic accident problem, recent investigatlons have attempted to place the various contributing
factors into proper perspective. To the surprise of few
researchers, the factor of "driver inattention," lack of
alertness, has proven to be the most frequent contributor
to traffic crashes. Research findings have isolated
another factor, hazardous roads, as the second most frequent contributor to automobile accidents. Despite the
assertions of some independent research groups, vehicular
factors do not appear to be a frequent cause of traffic
accidents.
Because it is important that everyone who
drives a motor vehicle understands the causes of our
growing traffic accident problem, it is necessary to
examine in detail the evidence which has led professional
resea·rchers to isolate "driver inattention" and hazardous
road conditions as the most common contributors to traffic
crashes.
For several years, professional researchers have
theorized that the driver, the human factor, is the primary
source of our traffic ac~ident problem. The U. S. Department of Transportation (DOT) and the automobile industry
have responded to the need for research funds to explore
the role of human factors in traffic crashes . . In 1969,
DOT appropriated over 100 million dollars to finance postaccident investigations .of several hundred accidents in
each of 40 U. S. cities. As part of each investigation,
an interview questionnaire was administered to drivers.
These drivers were asked to assess the degree to which
vehicular, human, road, and other environmental factors
contributed to their accident. The results isolated a
factor which was labeled "driver inattention" as a contributing factor in 55% of the total accidents.
Reasons
given for inattention were varied, ranging from physical
fatigue, to reprimanding a child in the back seat, to
"daydreaming." DOT c.oncluded that Americans take the
driving task very much for granted; so much so that_t~ey
seldom devote it complete attention under normal dr1v1ng
conditions.
Another important findi~g ?f. the ~OT stud~ rega~ds
the role of hazardous road cond1 t1ons ·1n ·trafflc acc1dents.
Hazardous .roads were found to be the second most frequent
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contributor to crashes. Arthur Little, writing recently
in· The· ·st·a·te· ·o'f ·the ·A·r ·t ·o·f Tr·a·f .fi ·c ·s·a·fe.ty s_ummarized his
review of related research by stating that "Information
available on the various aspects of the roadway itself is
extensive and has been well documented over a considerable
number of years. Factors which emerge as particularly
important are the -~i~blems associated with skidding and
nighttime driving." Mills and Shelton (1968) studied highway accidents in Virginia and found that 40% of all reported
accidents over a one-year period involved skidding. Sign i ficantly, in one-thiid of these accidents, the skidding
occurred before brake application. Such controlled
investigations have clearly established hazardous road
conditions as a frequent ·contributor to traffic accidents.
Further, these and other recently recorded data provide
convincing evidence that vehicular malfunctions play an
ins~gnificant ·role in our traffic .accident problem. -

/
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(Filler Essay for Control Groups)
The Benefits of Brushing Teeth after Every Meal
Even though we all recognize the wisdom of brushing
our teeth after e~~ry meal, this practice is so important
that it is worthwhile to review some of tne reasons for
carry~ng ?ut this va~uable bealth measure.
Naturally, tooth
brush1ng 1mproves ·the appearance of our teeth, something
that is desirable in itself. More important, science has
demonstrated many health benefits deriving from brushing
our teeth.
Tooth brushing has been found to be ·of importance
even in combating other mouth diseases besides tooth decay . .
And, by preventing these oral diseases, tooth brushing
after every meal also reduces the complications in other
parts of our body which are often the results of unchecked
tooth decay.
Because of the ·extreme importance of the
practice, let us review briefly some of the reasons why
brushing one's teeth after every meal is so necessary for
the preservation of health.
Besides reducing tooth decay, brushing the teeth
after every meal has a~ditional health benefits. There are
a number of other mouth diseases as unpleasant as tooth
decay that are produced by mouth bacteria. These bacteria
can, for example, cause diseases of the gums such as
pyorrhea (or R~ggs' disease). These diseases are painful
and unattractive themselves and unless quickly checked,
can lead to loss of teeth . and other secondary complications.
In addition, they have some unexpected side effects such
as malnutrition, since t~e sufferer is unable to continue
his normal solid diet while the conditions continue.
Brushing the teeth also reduces the concentration of the
bacteria that cause these diseases. (just as it reduces the
concentration of the decay-causing bacteria) in three ways:
?by mechanically dislodging the bacteria; by removing the
food particles they need in order to grqw; and by the
introduction of bacteria-killing chemicals in the tooth
paste. Hence, frequent tooth brushing is important, not
only for the prevention of tooth decay, but also as a
guard against other mouth diseases.
Not only does tooth brushing directly reduce to?th .
decay and other mouth diseases, but by helping to ma1nta1n
good oral hygiene it also aids in keeping other parts of
the body healthy.~ Tooth decay, for exarn~le, i~ bas~cally
a chronic infection, and like any other 1nfeot1on, 1t has
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harmful effects not just on the directly affected areas,
but also upon the body as a whole.
Such chronic infections
tend to lower the person's resistance to all diseases and
often affect other specific organs. For example, we know
that many cases of liver and kidney diseases as well as
poor eyesight and even blindness, can be traced back to
tooth decay. While tooth decay is not responsible for all
kidney, liver arid- eye diseases, more of these diseases
are due to chronic infection .from tooth de~ay than is
generally recognized. Therefore, brushing the teeth after
each meal not · only constitutes good oral hygiene, but it
also makes for good general body health.
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(Filler Essay for Control Groups)
The Benefits of Brushi~g Teeth after -Every Meal
Even though we all rec~gn~ze the wisdom of brushitig
our teeth after every meal, the practice is so important
that it is worthwhile to review ·some of the· reasons for
carrying out this valuable health measure. Naturally,
tooth brushing improves· th~ appearance of our te~th ·
.
'
someth1ng
that is desirable ·in itself. More important,
science has demonstrated many health benefits deriving
from brushing our te~th. Tooth brushing provides th~
best means we have of eliminating decay-causing bacteria
which can destroy both teeth and gums.
Such decaypreventing measures have become especially important
nowadays when our cha~ging food habits . . are tending to
increase the likelihood of tooth decay.
Let us look
briefly into some of the reasons why brushing one's tee.th
after every meal is so important.
It has been known for a long time that the major
cause of tooth decay (dental .caries) is a general class
of oral bacteria which are commonly known as "decay
bacteria." A certain ·a mount of these bacteria which
attack and damage teeth and gums are found in the human
mouth at all times.
Brushing one's teeth tends to remove
these bacteria both mechanically and chemically.
Several
dental schools in this country and abroad have conducted
experiments in which they have measured the number of
.
bacteria present in the mouths of people who brushed the1r
teeth after every meal and those who did not.
It was
found that approximately 78% of the decay bacteria we:re
eliminated after each brushing.
(Since the remaining
bacteria multiply very rapidly between and during meals,
it is important to brush one's teeth again after each
meal.)
It was also found that regular tooth brushing
reduces the decay by as much as 70% below what it is with
only occasional brushings. Thus, by killi~g these ~ecay
bacteria brushing one's . teeth after every meal cons1derably
redvces tooth decay. ·
While brushing one's teeth after every meal has
always been a recommended health practice, it has ~ecome
more important than ever today because of chang~s 1n our
eating habits.
In this country, we are now ea~1ng a
richer diet than ever before. Each year, we f1nd a large
increase in the per person consumption.of such food~ as
fruit juices, soft drinks, cakes, cand1es, etc., wh1ch are
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the very foods which are most likely to cause tooth decay.
Furthermore, there is an increasing tendency to eat between
meals:
the coffee break, the coke break, the after-themovie soda, and the TV or bedtime snack are becoming more
and more popular. This between-meal food intake notably
increases the possibility of tooth decay.
Hence, to
counteract these dietary trends that threaten to make the
tooth decay probiem· even greater than before, it has become
increasingly important that we take the most effective
counter-measure against decay, namely, brushing our teeth
after every meal.

APPENDIX E
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE SUBJECTS
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(COVER PAGE FOR SKILLS BOOKLET)

SKILLS BOOKLET
On the following pages you will find short essays on
several topics. These essays have been prepared by a
research team at the Institute for Social Research, and
are designed to test reading $kills. Please follow closely
the instructions below. If you have a question, come to
the front of the room and .ask it privately. Do not· ask
it al·oud.
-- --

( 1)

Do not turn this, or any, page until asked to do so.

(2)

When instructed, read the following page at a fairly
rapid pace, underlining what you believe to be the
crucial clause (or group of words) in each paragraph.
You will be given 5 minutes to complete each page.
When you ·finish ·a ·p·ag·e; stop ·and ·aw·ai t ·fu·r ·ther
1nstruct1ons.

(3)

At no time should you turn back to a previous page.

DO NOT TURN THIS PAGE UNTIL TOLD TO DO SO.
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